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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Appellant Interwest Construction respectfully submits the 
following reply brief. 
I. ARGUMENT 
POINT I: 
INTERWEST IS NOT REQUIRED TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION WAS NEVER IN DISPUTE 
Palmers claim that Interwest is required to marshal all 
evidence in support of the trial court's findings and that Interwest 
has failed to do so. However, in this case there is no need to 
marshal the facts and present them in the light most favorable to 
the trial court's findings because the facts regarding the contract 
between Interwest and Palmers, the amount unpaid thereunder and 
the circumstances under which the unpaid amount would become 
due and payable have never been in dispute. These facts were not 
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only admitted but alleged by Interwest in the Complaint and 
Amended Complaint filed herein. The simple issue before this 
Court is not one of fact nor whether the evidence supports the 
judgment but is one of law, i.e., whether the trial court correctly 
interpreted the contract between the parties. Interwest does not 
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings and conclusions but instead challenged the court's 
determination of the legal principles employed in arriving at those 
findings and conclusions. The trial court's conclusions of law are 
"accorded no particular deference, we review them for correctness." 
Doelle v. Bradley, 784 P.2d 1176, 1179 (Utah 1989). 
POINT II: 
PALMERS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO FINAL PAYMENT. 
Regardless of when the Treatment Plant was completed, the 
fact remains that Interwest had not been paid in full by Thiokol for 
the work performed under its general contract and remained unpaid 
until the conclusion of Thiokol's appeals in this matter. Pursuant to 
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the clear terms of the Subcontract between Palmers and Interwest, 
Palmers were not entitled to full payment until Interwest was paid in 
full. When payment was made by Thiokol, Interwest did pay to 
Palmers the full amount due. 
Palmers atj.;ue thai bits an,l pieces ol llir contract, have been 
put forwarc support ol Inlerwest's arguments however, Palmers 
ignore the fact that it is appropriate to look to the contract as a 
whole when the interpretation of the contract is in question. Gordon 
v. CRS Consulting Engineers, Inc., 820 P.2d 492, 494 (Utah App. 
1991) citing Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.'Jd 
1381!, 138.S (Ulnh l'W<>) When icad as ,\ whnlc, the Subroutinet 
Agreement is clear that Palmers were bound by and subject to the 
general contract between Thiokol and Interwest and until the 
contract was fully satisfied, Palmers' performance under the 
Subcontract Agreement was not complete and they were not entitled 
to final payment. Therefore, Interwest was j u s 11 fin I i n witl 111< >I<:iJ i lg 
final payment Ironi I'almers. 
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POINT III: 
INTERWEST IS ENTITLED TO INDEMNIFICATION 
AGAINST THE COSTS IT INCURRED IN 
DEFENDING THIS ACTION. 
Palmers argue that contracts of indemnity are to be strictly 
construed and that the Subcontract should be construed against 
Interwest and interpreted as not requiring Palmers to indemnify 
Interwest against claims that Palmers' work was defective. Palmers 
go so far as to cite Pickhover v. Smith Management Corporation, 771 
P.2d 664 (Utah App. 1989) as support for the strict construction 
rule. However, Palmers ignore both the rationale for the strict 
construction rule and the ruling of this Court in the Pickhover case. 
This Court, after a careful analysis of the current trend of the law, 
ruled in Pickhover. 
We hold that the rule [strict construction of indemnity 
agreements! applies only to indemnity provisions where 
the indemnitee seeks indemnification for the 
consequences of its own negligence. Id. at 670. 
Palmers cite two additional cases in support of their argument 
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that Interwest is not entitled to indemnification from them: Goldman 
v. Ecco-Pheonix Electricity Corporation, 396 P.2d 377 (Ca. 1964) and 
Tyee Construction Co. v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, 
472 P.2d 4 1 I (Wash App 1M70) Both cases are easily 
distinguishable. In Goldman, the general contractor sought 
indemnification against its own negligence involving a job site injury. 
In Tyee Construction, the indemnitee directed the indemnitor to do 
certain work in a particular way which ultimately resulted in 
damage to the indemnitee's property. cases the indemnitee 
sought to impose upon Hie indeinnih i.i* ••• of answering 
for the negligence or intentional acts of the indemnitee. 
In this case, Interwest has only sought to have Palmers abide 
by their Subcontract Agreement and hold Interwest harmless from 
Palmers' own alleged negligence or breaches of contract and against 
the negligence or bleaches ol lh< .sub' ontia< loi and supplieis for 
which Palmers are responsible. Interwest has not sought IUI ims 
Palmers provided any defense of claims that Interwest itself was 
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negligent. 
This case arose because Interwest found itself in the middle of 
a dispute between Thiokol, who claimed the tanks supplied by 
Palmers were defective and Palmers, who claimed that the tans 
failed because of Thiokors modifications. No one has claimed nor is 
there any evidence to support a claim that Interwest contributed to 
the failure in any way, yet Thiokol withheld funds earned by and 
rightfully belonging to Interwest solely on account of the tank 
failure. Under such circumstances, Interwest did not and does not 
seek to shift the burden of its own negligence or breaches of 
contract to Palmers, but has merely sought to have Palmers defend 
Interwest against Thiokol's claims and hold it harmless from the 
damage Interwest suffered on account of Thiokol's withholding of 
payment. 
Palmers also argue that because the trial court ultimately 
found that the cause of the failure was the overfilling of the tanks 
and not poor workmanship or faulty materials, as was claimed by 
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Thiokol, Interwest is not entitled to be indemnified by Palmers. 
Palmers' argument leads to the conclusion that any party that seeks 
to be indemnified against the claimed negligence 01 I >i eacl i «>l 
contract ot another < an only iccovei if, in lai I the liulemnitoi is 
ultimately found i<> be negligent or to have breached its contract. 
If such an argument were accepted by this Court, the result would 
be that in all cases in which indemnification is an element, no 
indemnitee would ever accept a tender of the defense of a claim and 
both the indemnitor and the indemnite< 
against .sine claims* icsiilung, as n this case, in the 
expenditure of additional attorneys' fees by both parties. 
POINT IV 
PALMERS CAN ONLY RECOVER THE FEES NECESSARY TO 
ENFORCE THE SUBCONTRACT 
Assuming that Interwest breached its contract and that 
Palmers did not breach the contract, Pal MUMS is only entitled lo 
those fees relating erclaim for payment of the balance 
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due under the contract, not for establishing lack of breach and a 
lack of construction defects. 
The cases which Palmers cites such as R & R Energies v. 
Mother Earth Ind., 936 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1997); Equitable Life and 
Cas. Co. v. Ross, 849 P.2d 1187 (Utah App. 1993) and Utah Farm 
Products Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62 (Utah 1981) do not 
support Palmers' argument. Those cases involve claims for breach 
and a defense of that claim of breach, where there would be a 
contractual duty to pay fees. However, in this case where the 
principle cause of action is for indemnity, there is no underlying 
contractual duty to pay fees. 
In addition, it is of no consequence that Interwest chose to 
bring this action against Palmers initially and only later joined 
Thiokol as a defendant even though the trial court thought this 
sequence of events significant. Palmers are chargeable with 
knowledge that attorneys fees were not recoverable under the 
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underlying general contract between Interwest and Thiokol.1 No 
matter the alignment of the parties in this case, the fact remains 
that Interwest was never entitled to recover fees against Thiokol and 
that fact should have no bearing upon the issue of whether or not 
Interwest or Palmers are entitled to fees against one another. 
POINT V 
INTERWEST IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES INCURRED 
IN MAKING THIS APPEAL 
If Interwest is successful in this appeal, the Court would be 
justified in awarding it attorney's fees as claimed at trial and also 
those fees Interwest has incurred in bringing this appeal. Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5 (1986). 
III. CONCLUSION 
There is no evidence that requires marshaling in this case and 
this Court may review the trial court's decision for correctness. The 
1
 "The Contractor and Subcontractor agree to be bound by the 
terms of the prime contract agreement, . . . " Paragraph 1, 
Subcontract Agreement, Exhibit 37. 
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trial court was incorrect in its interpretation of the Subcontract 
Agreement and should have given effect to the full intention of the 
agreement which is clearly to place upon Palmers the sole 
responsibility of defending the quality of its workmanship and 
materials. 
Interwest respectfully requests that this Court reverse and 
remand this matter to the lower court to award attorney's fees 
Interwest and against Palmers. 
DATED this l day of March, 1999. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Steven D. Crawley ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
Interwest Construction 
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